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Abstract—Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced
processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high
public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of
these attacks is information leakage across ”covert channels” that
reveal secret data without any explicit information flow between
the secret and the attacker. Many sources believe that such covert
channels are intrinsic to highly advanced processor architectures
based on speculation and out-of-order execution, suggesting that
such security risks can be avoided by staying away from high-
end processors. This paper, however, shows that the problem is
of wider scope: we present new classes of covert channel attacks
which are possible in average-complexity processors with in-order
pipelining, as they are mainstream in applications ranging from
Internet-of-Things to Autonomous Systems.
We present a new approach as a foundation for remedy
against covert channels: while all previous attacks were found
by clever thinking of human attackers, this paper presents
an automated and exhaustive method called “Unique Program
Execution Checking” which detects and locates vulnerabilities to
covert channels systematically, including those to covert channels
unknown so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
Subtle behaviors of microprocessors, notable at the level of
their hardware (HW) implementation in digital logic, are the
root cause of security breaches demonstrated in the Spectre [1]
and Meltdown [2] attacks. In design flows commonly used
in industry, the digital designer describes the logic behavior
of the processor in a clock cycle-accurate way and defines
for each instruction the elementary steps of its execution
based on the processor’s registers. Such design descriptions
at the “Register-Transfer Level (RTL)” are often referred to
as the microarchitecture of a processor. Numerous degrees
of freedom exist for the designer in choosing an appropriate
microarchitecture for a specification of the processor given at
the level of its instruction set architecture (ISA).
However, the same degrees of freedom that the designer
uses for optimizing a processor design may also lead to
microarchitectural side effects that can be exploited in security
attacks. In fact, it is possible that, depending on the data that
is processed, one and the same program may behave slightly
differently in terms of what data is stored in which registers
and at which time points. These differences only affect detailed
timing at the microarchitectural level and have no impact on
the correct functioning of the program at the ISA level, as
seen by the programmer. However, if these subtle alterations
of program execution at the microarchitectural level can be
caused by secret data, this may open a “side channel”. An
attacker may trigger and observe these alterations to infer
secret information.
In microarchitectural side channel attacks, the possible
leakage of secret information is based on some microarchitec-
tural resource which creates an information channel between
different software (SW) processes that share this resource.
For example, the cache can be such a shared resource, and
various attacking schemes have been reported which can
deduce critical information from the footprint of an encryption
software on the cache [3], [4], [5], [6]. Also other shared
resources can be (mis-)used as channel in side-channel attacks,
as has been shown for DRAMs [7] and other shared functional
units [8].
In these scenarios, the attacker process alone is not capable
of controlling both ends of a side channel. In order to steal
secret information, it must interact with another process initi-
ated by the system, the “victim process”, which manipulates
the secret. This condition for an attack actually allows for
remedies at the SW level which are typically applied to
security-critical SW components like encryption algorithms.
Common measures include constant time encryption [9] and
cache access pattern obfuscation [10]. They prohibit the infor-
mation flow at one end of the channel which is owned by the
victim process.
This general picture was extended by the demonstration of
the Spectre [1] and Meltdown [2] attacks. They constitute a
new class of microarchitectural side channel attacks which
are based on so called “covert channels”. These are special
cases of microarchitectural side channels in which the attacker
controls both ends of the channel, the part that triggers the side
effect and the part that observes it. In this scenario, a single
user-level attacker program can establish a microarchitectural
side channel that can leak the secret although it is not
manipulated by any other program. Such HW covert channels
not only can corrupt the usefulness of encryption and secure
authentication schemes, but can steal data essentially anywhere
in the system.
This paper presents new covert channels in average com-
plexity processors that can have severe implications for a wide
range of applications in Embedded Systems and Internet-of-
Things (IoT) where simple in-order processors are commonly
used. Our results show that HW vulnerabilities by covert
channels are not only a consequence of early architectural
decisions on the features of a processor, such as out-of-order
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Fig. 1. In-order pipeline vulnerability: the design decision whether or not a
cancellation mechanism is implemented for the transaction between memory
and cache does neither have an impact on functional design correctness nor
on the correct implementation of the memory protection. However, it may
insert a microarchitectural side effect that can form the basis for a covert
channel-based attack.
execution or speculative execution. In fact, vulnerabilities can
also be introduced at a later design stage in the course of
microarchitectural optimizations, targeting speed and energy,
for example.
Clearly, it cannot be expected from a designer to anticipate
all “clever thinking” of potential attackers who attempt to
create covert channels. Therefore, this paper is dedicated to
presenting a new technique which automatically detects all
microarchitectural side effects and points the designer to the
HW components that may be involved in the possible creation
of a covert channel.
Fig. 1 illustrates how a HW vulnerability may be created
by certain design decisions even in a simple in-order pipeline.
Consider two instructions as they are executed by a 5-stage
pipeline, and let us assume that register R1 contains the
address of some secret data that should not be accessible
for a user-level program. (Note that the address itself can be
routinely processed by any user program.) Let us consider the
routine situation where the cache holds a copy of the secret
data from an earlier execution of operating system-level code.
The first instruction, as it enters the memory (M) stage of
the pipeline, makes a READ request to the protected address,
attempting to read the secret data. The second instruction at
the same time enters the execute (EX) stage of the pipeline and
uses the secret data in an address calculation. For performance
reasons, a cached copy of the requested secret data may
be forwarded directly to the EX stage. This is a common
and correct microarchitectural forwarding [11] feature and,
by itself, doesn’t cause a problem if the memory protection
scheme in place makes sure that neither instruction #1 nor any
of the subsequent instructions in the pipeline can complete.
We assume that such a memory protection scheme is correctly
implemented in our scenario.
In the next clock cycle, as shown in the two bottom parts
of Fig. 1, instruction #1 enters the write-back (WB) stage and
instruction #2 enters the M stage of the pipeline. Concurrently,
the memory protection unit has identified in this clock cycle
that instruction #1 attempts access to a protected location. This
raises an exception for illegal memory access and causes the
pipeline to be flushed. From the perspective of the programmer
at the ISA level the shown instructions are ignored by the
system. In place of these instructions a jump to the exception
handler of the operating system (OS) is executed.
However, depending on certain design decisions, the in-
struction sequence may have a side effect. Instruction #2
triggers a READ request on the cache. Let us assume that
this request is a cache miss, causing the cache controller to
fill the corresponding cache line from main memory. Even
though the READ request by the pipeline is never fulfilled
because it is canceled when the exception flushes the pipeline,
it may have measurable consequences in the states of the
microarchitecture. In the scenario on the left (“vulnerable
design”) the state of the cache is changed because the cache
line is updated.
Such a cache foot print dependent on secret data is the
basis for the Meltdown attack. It can be exploited as detailed
in [2]. However, in Meltdown this critical step to open a
covert channel is only accomplished exploiting the out-of-
order execution of instructions. In our example, however,
the behavior of the cache-to-memory interface may cause
the security weakness. Not only the core-to-cache transaction
but also the cache-to-memory transaction must be canceled
in case of an exception to avoid any observable side effect
(“secure design” variant on the right). This is not at all obvious
to a designer. There can be various reasons why designers
may choose not to implement cancellation of cache updates.
First of all, both design variants are functionally correct.
Moreover, the vulnerable design prohibits access to protected
memory regions. Implementing the cancellation feature incurs
additional cost in terms of design and verification efforts,
hardware overhead, power consumption, etc. There is no good
reason for implementing the feature unless the designer is
aware of the vulnerability.
This example shows that a Meltdown-style attack can be
based on even subtler side effects than those resulting from
out-of-order execution. This not only opens new possibilities
3for known Meltdown-style attacks in processors with in-order
pipelines. These subtle side effects can also form the basis for
new types of covert channel-based attacks which have been
unknown so far (as demonstrated in Sec. III).
The key contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
• This paper, for the first time, presents the experimental
evidence that new kinds of covert channel attacks are also
possible in simple in-order processors. We present the
Orc attack, which uses a so far unknown type of covert
channel.
• We present a method for security analysis by Unique
Program Execution Checking (UPEC). UPEC employs
a rigorous mathematical (formal) analysis on the mi-
croarchitectural level (RTL). By employing the proposed
UPEC methodology the designer can precisely assess
during design time to what extent hardware security is
affected by the detailed design decisions.
• Based on UPEC, for the first time, covert channels can be
detected by a systematic and largely automated analysis
rather than only by anticipating the clever thinking of
a possible attacker. UPEC can even detect previously
unknown HW vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by the
discovery of the Orc attack in our experiments.
II. RELATED WORK
Information flow tracking (IFT) has been widely used in
the field of security for HW/SW systems. Its core idea is to
enhance the hardware and/or the software in a way that the
flow of information is explicitly visible. Different techniques
have been proposed in order to instrument the processor
with additional components enabling it to monitor information
flows and possibly block the illegal flows at run time [12],
[13]. Also CC-hunter [14] targets illegal information flows at
run time. It instruments a processor with a special module
called covert channel auditor which uncovers covert channel
communications between a trojan and a spy process through
detecting specific patterns of conflicting accesses to a shared
resource [14]. All these methods incur high overhead on the
design and demand modifications at different levels of the
system, such as in the instruction set architecture (ISA), the
operating system (OS) and the HW implementation. CC-hunter
also requires defining the conflict indicator event for each
resource which can open a covert channel. This demands a
priori knowledge about possible covert channels. In order to
capture and remove timing-based side channels in the design
the gate-level netlist can be instrumented with IFT capabili-
ties [15]. Such a gate-level IFT method is meant to be applied
to selected modules such as a crypto-core or a bus controller.
It faces complexity problems when addressing security issues
of the larger system. Moreover, since the underlying analysis
is based on simulation, relevant corner cases may be missed.
Ardeshiricham et al. [16] developed an RTL transformation
framework, called RTLIFT, for enhancing an existing RTL
model with information flow tracking (IFT). The method is
mainly based on gate-level IFT [13] and has been extended
by the Clepsydra approach [17] to covering information flow
through timing channels. However, any approach based on
inserting constant-time operations into the design, due to the
induced overhead, cannot provide a universal solution to the
existence of microarchitectural attacks, such as Meltdown [6].
Software security has been seen as a crucial factor in overall
system security and security specification and verification have
long been studied by the software community [18], [19]. One
of the main challenges in this field is the inability of classical
property languages such as CTL to specify the needed security
requirements [20]. Hyperproperties and also HyperLTL and
HyperCTL* have been proposed for specifying and verifying
security requirements of software [20], [21]. Hyperproperties
provide the possibility of effectively specifying general secu-
rity requirements such as non-interference and observational
determinism [20]. Detecting security vulnerabilities and ver-
ifying information flow in software are also targeted by the
methods of taint analysis and symbolic execution, as surveyed
in [22].
These works have proven to be effective in finding vulner-
abilities in software. However, the security threats in HW/SW
systems are not limited to the software alone. Vulnerabilities
can emerge from HW/SW interaction or from the hardware
itself. Also, certain SW vulnerabilities are exploitable through
the existence of microarchitectural features (e.g., cache side
channel attacks). This category of security threats may only
be visible at a specific level of hardware abstraction. Although
the security requirements covering such issues are related
to the ones addressed in SW verification, the SW security
notions cannot be easily adopted in the domain of hardware
and HW-dependent software. Open questions such as how to
model hardware and the information flow in hardware, how to
formulate security requirements for hardware and how to han-
dle the computational complexity pose significant challenges.
Especially after Spectre and Meltdown have created awareness
for these questions, this has sparked new and intensive research
activities in the domain of hardware security.
Instruction level abstraction (ILA) is an approach to create
a HW-dependent model of the software and formally verify
security requirements [23]. This method has the advantage
of capturing vulnerabilities which are not visible in the soft-
ware/firmware itself, but rather manifest themselves through
the communication between software and hardware. However,
HW security vulnerabilities in the RTL implementation of the
hardware cannot be detected by this approach.
The use of formal techniques for security verification in
hardware was pioneered in [24], [25], [26] by adopting the
idea of taint analysis which originally comes from the software
domain. This is the research which is the most closely related
to our work. In those approaches a HW security requirement
such as a specific confidentiality requirement is formulated
in terms of a taint property [24] along a certain path in
the design. The property fails if the taint can propagate, i.e.,
the information can flow from the source of the path to its
destination, while conforming to a propagation condition. This
is also related to the notion of observational determinism
defined in [20] in the sense that a taint property checks whether
the observations at the end of the taint path (destination) are
functionally independent of values at the source of the path.
4This was further developed in [25] and a portfolio of different
taint properties in the CTL language was created. In order to
formulate the properties in CTL, certain assumptions about the
attack are required which significantly restrict the coverage of
the method.
As an alternative, a miter-based equivalence checking tech-
nique, with some resemblance to our computational model
in Fig. 3, has been used in previous approaches [26], [27].
Although this increases the generality of the proof, it still
restricts the attack to a certain path. Moreover, since some
of this work considers verification at the architectural level,
vulnerabilities based on microarchitectural side channels are
not detectable.
Taint analysis by these approaches has shown promise for
formal verification of certain problems in HW security, for ex-
ample, for proving key secrecy in an SoC. It also proved useful
for security analysis in abstract system models. Note, however,
that all these approaches mitigate the complexity of formal
security analysis by decomposing the security requirements
into properties along selected paths. This demands making
assumptions about what paths are suspicious and requires
some “clever thinking” along the lines of a possible attacker.
As a result, non-obvious or unprecedented side channels may
be missed.
Any leakage determined by a taint property will also be
found using UPEC because any counterexample to the taint
property is also a counterexample to the UPEC property of
Eq. 1. The important advantage of UPEC is, however, that it
does not need any specification of the expected leakage path.
Micro-architectural side channel attacks are a security threat
that cannot be discovered by looking only at software and
verifying hyperproperties or taint properties. In order to secure
the hardware against side-channel attacks at design time, the
notion of non-interference has been adopted in [28], [29] to
prove the absence of side channels in a hardware design.
Non-interference in hardware is a strong and also conserva-
tive security requirement. However, the amount of incurred
overhead is usually prohibitive in many hardware design
scenarios. Designers usually try to quantitatively evaluate the
existence and leakiness of side channels to make a leak/risk
tradeoff [30]. Such quantitative approaches usually either use
simulation-based methods to collect and analyze a set of
execution traces [31] or estimate leaks through mathematical
modeling [32].
The whole picture has been significantly altered after the
emergence of Meltdown and Spectre, which proved the exis-
tence of a new class of side-channel attacks that do not rely
on a valid execution of a victim software and can be carried
out even if there is no vulnerability in the deployed software.
The new findings prove the inadequacy of existing verification
techniques and call for new methods capable of addressing the
new issues. While the software verification methods are not
capable of finding covert channel attacks because they abstract
away the whole microarchitecture, hardware taint property
techniques came also short of capturing these vulnerabilities
due to path limitation, as mentioned above.
This paper addresses the issue of covert channel attack
vulnerabilities by proving unique program execution. UPEC
defines the requirement for security against covert channel
attacks in microarchitecture designs at the RTL (in which most
of the related vulnerabilities appear) and provides a method-
ology to make proofs feasible for mid-size processors. Unlike
the above techniques for software verification which try to
verify a given software, UPEC models software symbolically
so that it exhaustively searches for a program exposing a HW
security vulnerability, or proves that no such program exists.
Language-based security is another line of research which
advocates the use of more expressive security-driven hardware
description languages. SecVerilog [33] extends the Verilog
language with a security type system. The designer needs
to label storage elements with security types, which enables
enforcing information flow properties. Although using Verilog
as the base of the language eases the adoption of the method,
the labeling process is complicated and the designer may
need to relabel the design in order to verify different security
properties. All in all, system-wide labeling of an RTL design
with thousands of state bits usually is not a trivial task.
Program synthesis techniques have been proposed to target
HW security vulnerabilities related to Meltdown, Spectre and
their variants [34]. With the help of these techniques, program
tests capable of producing a specific execution pattern for
a known attack can be generated automatically. In order to
evaluate security for a certain microarchitecture against the
attack, the user needs to provide a formal description of the
microarchitecture and the execution pattern associated with
the attack. The synthesis tool can then synthesize the attacker
program which can be later used to test the security of the
computing system against the considered attack. Although the
method automates the generation of an attacker program, the
execution pattern of the considered attack must be specified
by the user, i.e., the user still needs to develop the attack in
an abstract way by reasoning along the lines of a possible
attacker. Furthermore, the coverage of the generated tests are
restricted to known attacks and vulnerabilities.
III. ORC: A NEW KIND OF COVERT CHANNEL ATTACK
The term Read-After-Write (RAW) Hazard denotes a well-
known design complication resulting directly from pipelining
certain operations in digital hardware [11]. The hazard occurs
when some resource is to be read after it is written causing a
possible stall in the pipeline. RAW hazards exist not only in
processor execution pipelines but also elsewhere, e.g., in the
core-to-cache interface.
For reasons of performance, many cache designs employ
a pipelined structure which allows the cache to receive new
requests while still processing previous ones. This is partic-
ularly beneficial for the case of store instructions, since the
core does not need to wait until the cache write transaction
has completed. However, this can create a RAW hazard in the
cache pipeline, if a load instruction tries to access an address
for which there is a pending write.
A RAW hazard needs to be properly handled in order to
ensure that the correct values are read. A straightforward
implementation uses a dedicated hardware unit called hazard
51: li x1, #protected_addr // x1 ← #protected_addr
2: li x2, #accessible_addr // x2 ← #accessible_addr
3: addi x2, x2, #test_value // x2 ← x2 + #test_value
4: sw x3, 0(x2) // mem[x2+0] ← x3
5: lw x4, 0(x1) // x4 ← mem[x1+0]
6: lw x5, 0(x4) // x5 ← mem[x4+0]
Fig. 2. Example of an Orc attack: in this RISC-V code snippet, accessi-
ble addr is an address within the accessible range of the attacker process. Its
lower 8 bits are zero. The address within its 256 bytes offset is also accessible.
test value is a value in the range of 0. . . 255.
detection that checks for every read request whether or not
there is a pending write request to the same cache line. If
so, all read requests are removed until the pending write has
completed. The processor pipeline is stalled, repeating to send
read requests until the cache interface accepts them.
In the following, we show an example how such a cache
structure can create a security vulnerability allowing an at-
tacker to open a covert channel. Let’s assume we have a
computing system with a cache with write-back/write-allocate
policy and the RAW hazard resolution just described. In the
system, some confidential data (secret data) is stored in a
certain protected location (protected address).
For better understanding of the example, let us make some
more simplifying assumptions that, however, do not com-
promise the generality of the described attack mechanism.
We assume that the cache holds a valid copy of the secret
data (from an earlier execution of privileged code). We also
simplify by assuming that each cache line holds a single byte,
and that a cache line is selected based on the lower 8 bits
of the address of the cached location. Hence, in our example,
there are a total of 28 = 256 cache lines.
The basic mechanism for the Orc attack is the following.
Every address in the computing system’s address space is
mapped to some cache line. If we use the secret data as an
address, then the secret data also points to some cache line.
The attacker program “guesses” which cache line the secret
data points to. It sets the conditions for a RAW hazard in
the pipelined cache interface by writing to the guessed cache
line. If the guess was correct then the RAW hazard occurs,
leading to slightly longer execution time of the instruction
sequence than if the guess was not correct. Instead of guessing,
of course, the attacker program iteratively tries all 256 possible
cache locations until successful.
Fig. 2 shows the instruction sequence for one such iteration.
The shown #test_value represents the current guess of the
attacker and sets the RAW hazard conditions for the guessed
cache line. The sequence attempts an illegal memory access
in instruction #5 by trying to load the secret data from the
protected address into register x4. The processor correctly
intercepts this attempt and raises an exception. Neither is
the secret data loaded into x4 nor is instruction #6 executed
because the exception transfers control to the operating system
with the architectural state of instruction #5. However, before
control is actually transferred, instruction #6 has already
entered the pipeline and has initiated a cache transaction. The
cache transaction has no effect on the architectural state of the
processor. But the execution time of the instruction sequence
depends on the state of the cache. When probing all values
of #test_value, the case will occur where the read request
affects the same cache line as the pending write request, thus
creating a RAW hazard and a stall in the pipeline. It is this
difference in timing that can be exploited as a side channel.
Let us look at the sequence in more detail. The first three
instructions are all legal for the user process of the attacker.
Instruction #1 makes register x1 a pointer to the secret data.
Instruction #2 makes register x2 a pointer to some array in the
user space. The address of this array is aligned such that the 8
least significant bits are 0. Instruction #3 adds #test_value
as an offset to x2. This value is in the range 0. . . 255.
Instruction #4 is a store of some value x3 into the user
array at x2. This is a legal instruction that results in a write
request to the cache. Note that the destination cache line is
determined by #test_value since the lower 8 bits of the
write address are used for cache line addressing (cf. Sec. III).
The cache accepts the write request and immediately becomes
ready for a new request. The cache controller marks this write
transaction as pending until it is complete. (This takes a few
clock cycles in case of a cache hit and even significantly longer
in case of a miss.)
In the next clock cycle, instruction #5 attempts an illegal
load from the secret address, producing a read request to the
cache. It will take a small number of clock cycles before the
instruction has progressed to the write-back (WB) stage of the
processor pipeline. In this stage the exception will be raised
and control will be transferred to the OS kernel. Until the
instruction reaches the WB stage, however, all components
including the cache keep working. Since the cache has a valid
copy of the secret data, it instantly answers the read request
and returns the secret data to the core where it is stored in
some internal buffer (inaccessible to software).
Even though the illegal memory access exception is about to
be raised, instruction #6 is already in the pipeline and creates
a third read request to the cache. This request is created by a
forwarding unit using the value stored in the internal buffer.
Note that the request is for an address value equal to the secret
data. (It does not matter whether an attempt to load from this
address is legal or not.)
Let us assume that this address value happens to be mapped
to the same cache line as the write request to the user array
from instruction #4. This will be a read-after-write (RAW)
hazard situation, in case the write request from instruction #4
is still pending. The read transaction must wait for the write
transaction to finish. The cache controller stalls the core until
the pending write transaction has completed.
In case that the read request affects a different cache line
than the pending write request there is no RAW hazard and
the processor core is not stalled.
In both cases, the processor will eventually raise the ex-
ception and secret data will not appear in any of the program-
visible registers. However, the execution time of the instruction
sequence differs in the two cases because of the different num-
ber of stall cycles. The execution time depends on whether or
not a RAW hazard occurs, i.e., whether or not #test_value
is equal to the 8 lower bits of the secret data.
Assuming the attacker knows how many clock cycles it
takes for the kernel to handle the exception and to yield the
6control back to the parent process, the attacker can measure
the difference in execution time and determine whether the
lower 8 bits of the secret are equal to #test_value or not.
By repeating the sequence for up to 256 times (in the worst
case), the attacker can determine the lower 8 bits of the secret.
If the location of the secret data is byte-accessible, the attacker
can reveal the complete secret by repeating the attack for each
byte of the secret. Hardware performance counters can further
ease the attack since they make it possible to explicitly count
the number of stalls.
This new covert channel can be illustrated at the example
of the RISC-V RocketChip [35]. The original RocketChip
design is not vulnerable to the Orc attack. However, with
only a slight modification (17 lines of code (LoC) in an
RTL design of ∼250,000 LoC) and without corrupting the
functionality, it was possible to insert the vulnerability. The
modifications actually optimized the performance of the design
by bypassing a buffer in the cache, by which an additional stall
between consecutive load instructions with data dependency
was removed. There was no need to introduce any new
state bits or to change the interface between core and cache.
The attack does not require the processor to start from a
specific state: any program can precede the code snippet of
Fig. 2. The only requirement is that protected_addr and
accessible_addr reside in the cache before executing the
code in Fig. 2.
The described vulnerability is a very subtle one, compared
to Meltdown and Spectre. It is caused by a RAW hazard not in
the processor pipeline itself but in its interface to the cache. It
is very hard for a designer to anticipate an attack scenario
based on this hazard. The timing differences between the
scenarios where the RAW hazard is effective and those where
it isn’t are small. Nevertheless, they are measurable and can
be used to open a covert channel.
This new type of covert channel discovered by UPEC gives
some important messages:
• Subtle design changes in standard RTL processor designs,
such as adding or removing a buffer, can open or close a
covert channel. This raises the question whether Spectre
and Meltdown are only the tip of the iceberg of covert
channels existing in today’s designs. Although specific to
a particular design, the newly discovered vulnerabilities
may inflict serious damage, once such a covert channel
becomes known in a specific product.
• The Orc attack is based on the interface between the core
(a simple in-order core in this case) and the cache. This
provides the insight that the orchestration of component
communication in an SoC, such as RAW hazard handling
in the core-to-cache interface, may also open or close
covert/side channels. Considering the complex details of
interface protocols and their implementation in modern
SoCs, this can further complicate verifying security of
the design against covert channel attacks.
• The new insight that the existence of covert channels does
not rely on certain types of processors but on decisions
in the RTL design phase underlines the challenge in cap-
turing such vulnerabilities and calls for methods dealing
with the high complexity of RTL models.
• The presented attack is based on a so far unsuspicious
microarchitectural feature as its covert channel. This
makes it resistant to most existing techniques of security
verification, as discussed in Sec. II. The verification
method, therefore, should be exhaustive and must not rely
on a priori knowledge about the possible attacks.
These challenges motivate the proposed UPEC approach. It
is meant to be used by the designer during the RTL design
phase to detect all possible cases of a covert channel.
IV. UNIQUE PROGRAM EXECUTION CHECKING (UPEC)
Confidentiality in HW/SW systems requires that an un-
trusted user process must not be able to read protected secret
data. In case of a microarchitectural covert channel attack,
the attacker cannot read the secret data directly. Nevertheless,
confidentiality is violated because the execution timing of
the attacker process depends on the secret data, and the
timing information is measurable, e.g., through user-accessible
counters. These timing differences may stem from various
sources that need to be exhaustively evaluated when verifying
confidentiality.
In the following, we refer to the computing system to be
analyzed for security as System-on-Chip (SoC) and divide its
state variables into two sets: state variables associated with the
content of its memory (main memory and memory-mapped
periphery) and state variables associated with all other parts
of the hardware, the logic parts.
Definition 1 (Microarchitectural State Variables).
The microarchitectural state variables of an SoC are the set
of all state variables (registers, buffers, flip-flops) belonging
to the logic part of the computing system’s microarchitecture.

A subset of these microarchitectural state variables are
program-visible:
Definition 2 (Architectural State Variables).
The architectural state variables of an SoC are the subset
of microarchitectural state variables that define the state of
program execution at the ISA level (excluding the program
state that is represented in the program’s memory). 
Definition 3 (Secret Data, Protected Location). A set of secret
data D is the content of memory at a protected location A,
i.e., there exists a protection mechanism such that a user-level
program cannot access A to read or write D. 
The protected location may be in the main memory space, in
peripherals or in other type of storage in the non-logic part of
the computing system. In addition, there may exist temporary
copies of the secret data in the cache system.
Definition 4 (Unique Program Execution). A program exe-
cutes uniquely w.r.t. a secret D if and only if the sequence
of valuations to the set of architectural state variables is
independent of the values of D, in every clock cycle of
program execution. 
In other words, a user-level program executes uniquely
if different secrets in the protected location do not lead to
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Fig. 3. Computational model for UPEC: two almost identical instances of
the computing system are considered. They contain the same data, except for
the secret data that may vary between the two instances. The memory block
in this figure stands for any resource that may carry secret data including
peripheral devices.
different values of the architectural states or to different time
points when these values are assigned.
Definition 5 (Confidentiality/Observability). A set of secret
data D in a protected location A is confidential if and only if
any user-level program executes uniquely w.r.t. D. Otherwise
D is observable. 
Based on this definition, confidentiality is established by
proving unique program execution at the RTL. In UPEC this
is analyzed by a mathematically rigorous, “formal”, method.
The requirement of unique program execution is formalized
as a “property” expressed in a property language which is
understood by a (commercially available) tool for property
checking. Current tools for property checking, however, are
built for functional design verification. In order to make
property checking applicable to UPEC, we present a tailor-
made computational model and formulate a specific property
to be proven on this model.
Fig. 3 shows the model that is used in our UPEC approach.
It can be derived automatically from the RTL description
of the design and only requires the user to provide the
protected memory region. In this model, SoC1 and SoC2
are two identical instances of the logic part of the SoC under
verification. Memory1 and Memory2, as indicated in the figure,
hold the same set of values except for the memory location of
a defined secret data.
Based on this model, we propose the UPEC property: For a
system to be secure w.r.t. covert channel attacks, the compu-
tational model derived from the design’s RTL description has
to fulfill the following property expressed in the CTL property
language [36]:
AG (secret data protected
∧micro soc state1 = micro soc state2
→ AG soc state1 = soc state2) (1)
In this formulation, micro soc state is a vector of all mi-
croarchitectural state variables, as defined in Def. 1, soc state
is some vector of state variables which includes, as a subset,
all architectural state variables as defined in Def. 2 but not
necessarily all other microarchitectural state variables. The
constraint secret data protected specifies that a protection
mechanism in the hardware is enabled for the secret data
memory location. The CTL operators AG denote that the
following condition must be fulfilled at all times and for all
possible runs of the system (“All paths, Globally”).
The property in Eq. 1 fails if and only if, in the system
under verification, there exists a state, soc state, such that the
transition to the next state, soc state’, depends on the secret
data. This covers all situations in which program execution is
not unique. Commercial property checking tools are available
to check such a property based on standardized languages
like SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) [37]. For reasons of
computational complexity, however, standard solutions will
fail so that a method specialized to this problem has been
developed, as described in Sec. V.
Importantly, in our methodology we will consider situations
where soc state, besides the architectural state variables of the
SoC, includes some or all microarchitectural state variables,
such as the pipeline buffers. Producing a unique sequence
for a superset of the architectural state variables represents
a sufficient but not a necessary condition for unique program
execution. This is because secret data may flow to microar-
chitectural registers which are not observable by the user
program, i.e., they do not change program execution at any
time, and, hence, no secret data is leaked.
We therefore distinguish the following kinds of counterex-
amples to the UPEC property:
Definition 6 (L-alert).
A leakage alert (L-alert) is a counterexample leading to a state
with soc state1 6= soc state2 where the differing state bits are
architectural state variables. 
L-alerts indicate that secret data can affect the sequence of
architectural states. This reveals a direct propagation of secret
data into an architectural register (that would be considered a
functional design bug), or a more subtle case of changing the
timing and/or the values of the sequence without violating
the functional design correctness and without leaking the
secret directly. UPEC will detect the HW vulnerability in both
cases. While the former case can be covered also by standard
methods of functionally verifying security requirements, this
is not possible in the latter case. Here, the opportunity for
a covert channel attack may be created, as is elaborated for
the Orc attack in Sec. III. Since the functional correctness
of a design is not violated, such a HW vulnerability will
escape all traditional verification methods conducted during
the microarchitectural design phase.
Definition 7 (P-alert). A propagation alert (P-alert) is a coun-
terexample leading to a state with soc state1 6= soc state2
where the differing state bits are microarchitectural state
variables that are not architectural state variables. 
P-alerts show possible propagation paths of secret data
from the cache or memory to program-invisible, internal state
variables of the system. A P-alert very often is a precursor to
an L-alert, because the secret often traverses internal, program-
invisible buffers in the design before it is propagated to an
architectural state variable like a register in the register file.
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include program-invisible state variables will be further elab-
orated in the following sections. In principle, our method
could be restricted to architectural state variables and L-alerts.
P-alerts, however, can be used in our proof method as early
indicators for a possible creation of a covert channel. This
contributes to mitigating the computational complexity when
proving the UPEC property.
V. UPEC ON A BOUNDED MODEL
Proving the property of Eq. 1 by classical unbounded CTL
model checking is usually infeasible for SoCs of realistic
size. Therefore, we pursue a SAT-based approach based on
“any-state proofs” in a bounded circuit model. This variant
of Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [38] is called Interval
Property Checking (IPC) [39] and is applied to the UPEC
problem in a similar way as in [40] for functional processor
verification.
For a full proof of the property in Eq. 1 by our bounded
approach, in principle, we need to consider a time window
as large as the sequential depth, dSOC, of the logic part of
the examined SoC. This will be infeasible in most cases.
However, employing a symbolic initial state enables the solver
to often capture hard-to-detect vulnerabilities within much
smaller time windows. A violation of the UPEC property is
actually guaranteed to be indicated by a P-alert in only a
single clock cycle needed to propagate secret data into some
microarchitectural state variable of the logic part of the SoC.
In practice, however, it is advisable to choose a time window
for the bounded model which is as long as the length, dMEM,
of the longest memory transaction. When the secret is in the
cache, dMEM is usually the number of clock cycles for a cache
read. When the secret is not in the cache, dMEM is the number
of clock cycles the memory response takes until the data has
entered the cache system, e.g., in a read buffer. This produces
P-alerts of higher diagnostic quality and provides a stronger
basis for inductive proofs that may be conducted subsequently,
as discussed below.
A. Dealing with spurious counterexamples
In the IPC approach, the symbolic initial state also includes
unreachable states of the system. This may result in counterex-
amples which cannot happen in the normal operation of the
system after reset (spurious counterexamples). This problem
is usually addressed by strengthening the symbolic initial state
by invariants, in order to exclude certain unreachable states.
However, developing invariants is mainly done in an ad-hoc
way and it is not a trivial task to find sufficient invariants in
a large SoC. However, the UPEC computational model and
property formulation make it possible to address the problem
of spurious counterexamples in a structured way. Since both
SoC instances start with the same initial state, all of the
unreachable initial states and spurious behaviors have the same
manifestation in both SoC instances and therefore do not
violate the uniqueness property, except for the states related
to the memory elements holding the secret value. Here, we
address the problem by adding three additional constraints on
the symbolic initial state.
Constraint 1, “no on-going protected accesses”. Protected
memory regions are inaccessible to certain user processes but
the OS-level kernel process can freely access these regions.
This can create a scenario for confidentiality violation in which
the kernel process loads secret data from a protected region
to a general-purpose register and then instantly branches into
a malicious user-level process. Such an explicit revelation
of secret data can be considered as spurious counterexample
and excluded from consideration since it cannot happen in a
SoC running an operating system within its normal operation.
To exclude these trivial leakage scenarios, the proof must
be constrained to exclude such initial states that implicitly
represent ongoing memory transactions in which protected
memory regions are accessed. This constraint can be formally
expressed by assuming that, at the starting time point, the
buffers holding the addresses for ongoing memory transactions
do not contain protected addresses. These buffers can be easily
identified by inspecting the fan-in of the memory interface
address port.
Constraint 2, “cache I/O is valid”. Since the cache can hold
a copy of the secret data, an unreachable initial state for the
cache controller may lead to a spurious counterexample where
the secret data is leaked in an unprivileged access. Deriving
invariants for a complex cache controller in order to exclude
such spurious behavior requires in-depth knowledge about the
design and, also, expertise in formal verification. However,
the task can be significantly simplified if we assume that the
cache is implemented correctly. This is justifiable because
UPEC-based security verification should be carried out on
top of conventional functional verification, in order to target
vulnerabilities not corrupting functionality but compromising
security.
Communication between the cache and the processor and
also higher levels of memory typically happens based on a
well-defined protocol. Spurious behaviors reveal themselves
by violating this protocol. Protocol compliance is usually
verified as a part of functional verification (through simulation
or formal techniques) and the requirements for such compli-
ance is usually defined by the protocol specification and does
not require in-depth knowledge about the implementation.
For UPEC, we ensure the protocol compliance and valid
I/O behavior of the cache by instrumenting the RTL with a
special cache monitor which observes the transactions between
the cache and other parts of the system (processor, main
memory, etc.) and raises a flag in case of an invalid I/O
behavior. Developing hardware monitors is standard practice
in verification and does not impose significant overhead in
terms of the effort involved.
Constraint 3, “secure system software”. Memory protection
mechanisms are meant to protect the content of memory from
user software, however, high-privilege softwares can freely
access the contents of memory (including the secret data).
Since it is not possible to have the complete OS/kernel in
our bounded model (due to complexity), this may lead to
trivial false counterexamples in which the system software
copies the secret data into an unprotected memory location
9or architectural state. In order to exclude such trivial cases,
a constraint is needed restricting the search to systems with
secure system software. The system software is considered
secure iff, under any possible input, there is no load instruction
accessing secret data, i.e., before any load instruction, there
is always an appropriate bounds check. In order to reflect
that in the proof, the added constraint specifies that when
the processor is in kernel mode, at the ISA level of program
execution, there is no load instruction of the system software
that accesses the secret. At the microarchitectural level this
means that either no load instruction of the system software
is executed that accesses the secret, or the execution of such
a load instruction is invalid, i.e., the load instruction has been
speculatively executed for a mispredicted bound check and is
invalid at the ISA level.
It should be noted that these constraints do not restrict
the generality of our proof. They are, actually, invariants of
the global system. Their validity follows from the functional
correctness of the OS and the SoC.
B. Mitigating complexity
As discussed in Sec. IV, in our computational model the
content of the memory is excluded from the soc state in the
UPEC property (Eq. 1). Therefore, the content of the memory
influences neither the assumption nor the commitment of the
property and, thus, can be disregarded by the proof method.
This observation helps us to mitigate the computational
proof complexity by black-boxing (i.e., abstracting away) the
data fields in the cache tables. This significantly reduces the
state space of the model while it does not affect the validity
of the proof. It is important to note that the logic parts of the
cache, such as tag array, valid bits, cache controller, memory
interface, etc., must not be black-boxed since they are part of
the microarchitectural state and they play a key role for the
security of the system.
In order to ensure that the partly black-boxed cache also
conforms with the assumption made about the memory by the
UPEC computational model, another constraint needs to be
added to the property:
Constraint 4, “equality of non-protected memory”. For any
read request to the cache, the same value must be returned by
the cache in both instances of the SoC, unless the access is
made to the memory location holding the secret data. This
constraint is always valid for a cache that is functionally
correct and therefore does not restrict the generality of the
proof.
C. UPEC interval property
The interval property for UPEC is shown in Fig. 4. The
macro secret data protected() denotes that in both SoC in-
stances, a memory protection scheme is enabled in the hard-
ware for the memory region holding the secret data. The macro
no ongoing protected access() defines that the buffers in each
SoC instance holding the addresses for ongoing transactions
do not point to protected locations (Constraint 1). The
macro cache monitor valid IO() specifies that in each clock
cycle during the time window of the property, the cache I/O
assume:
at t: secret data protected();
at t: micro soc state1 = micro soc state2;
at t: no ongoing protected access();
during t..t+ k: cache monitor valid IO();
during t..t+ k: secure system software();
prove:
at t+ k: soc state1 = soc state2;
Fig. 4. UPEC property (Eq. 1) formulated as interval property: it can be
proven based on a bounded model of length k using Satisfiability (SAT)
solving and related techniques.
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Fig. 5. UPEC Methodology: counterexamples to the UPEC property, P-alerts
and L-alerts, denote propagation of secret data into microarchitectural regis-
ters. Only L-alerts prove a security violation. P-alerts are only necessary but
not sufficient to detect a covert channel. However, they can be computed with
less effort. Based on this iterative process the designer can browse through
different counterexamples and exploit the trade-off between the computational
complexity and the diagnostic expressiveness of counterexamples to prove or
disprove security.
behaviors in the two SoC instances comply with Constraints
2 and 4. The last assumption implements Constraint 3.
VI. METHODOLOGY
Fig. 5 shows the general flow of UPEC-based security
analysis of computing systems. Checking the UPEC property
(Eq. 1) is at the core of a systematic, iterative process by which
the designer identifies and qualifies possible hardware vulner-
abilities in the design. The UPEC property is initialized on a
bounded model of length dMEM and with a proof assumption
and obligation for the complete set of microarchitectural state
variables.
If the UPEC property can be successfully verified, then
the design is proven to be free of side effects that can be
exploited as covert channels. If the property fails it produces
a counterexample which can be either an L-alert or a P-alert.
An L-alert exposes a measurable side effect of the secret
data on the architectural state variables, rendering the design
insecure. A P-alert documents a side effect of the secret
data on microarchitectural state variables that are not directly
accessible by the attacker program. In principle, the designer
can now remove the affected microarchitectural state variables
from the proof obligation of the UPEC property (while keeping
the complete set of microarchitectural state variables in the
proof assumption), and then re-iterate the process to search for
a different counterexample. The process is bound to terminate
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because, eventually, either an L-alert occurs or the design is
secure.
In practice, however, the designer will not simply eliminate
a P-alert but instead will analyze the counterexample. As
mentioned before, an L-alert may have one or several shorter
P-alerts as precursors. Since the P-alert is a shorter coun-
terexample than the corresponding L-alert it can be computed
with less computational effort, including shorter proof times.
A P-alert belonging to an L-alert documents the earliest
manifestation of a side effect and points the designer to the
source of the vulnerability that causes the side effect. If the
security compromise is already obvious from the P-alert the
designer may abort the iterative process of Fig. 5 by deeming
the P-alert as “insecure” and change the RTL in order to
remove the vulnerability. This may be as simple as adding or
removing a buffer. Note that if the designer wrongly deems a
P-alert as “secure” then the security compromise is detected by
another P-alert later, or, eventually, by an L-alert. The penalty
for making such a mistake is the increase in run times for
checking the later UPEC property instances.
If the procedure terminates without producing an L-alert
this is not a complete proof that the design is secure, unless
we increment the length of the model to dSOC. The alternative
is to take the P-alerts as starting point for proving security
by an inductive proof of the property in Eq. 1 for the special
case of an initial state derived from the considered P-alert. A
P-alert can be deemed as secure if the designer knows that the
values in the affected microarchitectural state variables will
not propagate under the conditions under which the P-alert
has occurred. In other words, in a secure P-alert, a certain
condition holds which implicitly represents the fact that the
propagation of secret data to architectural registers will be
blocked. In order to conduct the inductive proof the designer
must identify these blocking conditions for each P-alert. Based
on the UPEC computational model (Fig. 3) the inductive proof
checks whether or not the blocking condition always holds for
the system once the corresponding P-alert has been reached.
Finally, there is always the conservative choice of mak-
ing design changes until no P-alerts occur anymore, thus,
establishing full security for the modified design w.r.t. covert
channels.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
Our new insights into covert channels were obtained by im-
plementing UPEC in a prototype verification environment for
security analysis. It interfaces with a commercially available
property checking tool, OneSpin 360 DV-Verify, which is used
to conduct the IPC proofs underlying UPEC.
We explored the effectiveness of UPEC by targeting dif-
ferent design variants of RocketChip [35], an open-source
RISC-V [41] SoC generator. The considered RocketChip de-
sign is a single-core SoC with an in-order pipelined processor
and separate data and instruction level-1 caches.
All results were obtained using the commercial property
checker OneSpin 360 DV-Verify on an Intel Core i7-6700 CPU
with 32 GB of RAM, running at 3.4 GHz.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of UPEC for capturing
vulnerabilities we targeted the original design of RocketChip
TABLE I
UPEC METHODOLOGY EXPERIMENTS: For the original RocketChip design
the two settings are distinguished whether or not there is a valid copy of the
secret data in the cache. For each case the computational and manual efforts
are reported when following the UPEC methodology and analyzing possible
alerts.
D cached D not cached
dMEM 5 34
Feasible k 9 34
# of P-alerts 20 0
# of RTL registers causing P-alerts 23 N/A
Proof runtime 3 hours 35 min
Proof memory consumption 4 GB 8 GB
Inductive proof runtime 5 min N/A
Manual effort 10 person days 5 person hours
and two design variants made vulnerable to (a) a Meltdown-
style attack and (b) an Orc attack, with only minimal design
modifications. Functional correctness was not affected and
the modified designs successfully passed all tests provided
by the RISC-V framework. UPEC successfully captured all
vulnerabilities. In addition, UPEC found an ISA incompliance
in the Physical Memory Protection (PMP) unit of the original
design.
For the Meltdown-style attack we modified the design such
that a cache line refill is not canceled in case of an invalid
access. While the illegal access itself is not successful but
raises an exception, the cache content is modified and can
be analyzed by an attacker. We call this a Meltdown-style
attack since the instruction sequence for carrying out the attack
is similar to the one reported by [2]. Note, however, that in
contrast to previous reports we create the covert channel based
on an in-order pipeline.
For the Orc attack, we conditionally bypassed one buffer,
as described in Sec. III, thereby creating a vulnerability that
allows an attacker to open a covert timing side channel.
In the following experiments, the secret data is assumed to
be in a protected location, A, in the main memory. Protec-
tion was implemented using the Physical Memory Protection
(PMP) scheme of the RISC-V ISA [42] by configuring the
memory region holding the location A of the secret data as
inaccessible in user mode.
A. Experiments on the original RocketChip design
We conducted experiments on the original design for two
cases: (1) D initially resides in the data cache and main
memory, and, (2) D initially only resides in the main memory;
cf. the columns labeled “D in cache” and “D not in cache”
in Tab. I.
Separating the two cases and applying UPEC to them
individually is beneficial for the overall efficiency of the
procedure, because the solver does not have to consider both
cases implicitly within a single problem instance.
For the experiment with D not in the cache, UPEC proves
that there exists no P-alert. This means that the secret data
cannot propagate to any part of the system and therefore, the
user process cannot fetch the secret data into the cache or
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TABLE II
DETECTING VULNERABILITIES IN MODIFIED DESIGNS: For two different
attack scenarios the computational effort and window lengths to obtain the
alerts for disproving security are listed.
Design variant/vulnerability Orc Meltdown-style
Window length for P-alert 2 4
Proof runtime for P-alert 1 min 1 min
Window length for L-alert 4 9
Proof runtime for L-alert 3 min 18 min
access it in any other way. As a result, the system is proven
to be secure for the case that D is not in the cache. Since
the property proves already in the first iteration of the UPEC
methodology that there is no P-alert, the verification can be
carried out within few minutes of CPU time and without any
manual analysis.
For the case that D is initially in the cache, we need to
apply the iterative UPEC methodology (Fig. 5) in order to
find all possible P-alerts. We also tried to capture an L-alert
by increasing the length k of the time window, until the solver
aborted because of complexity. The second row in the table
shows the maximum k that was feasible. The following rows
show the computational effort for this k.
Each P-alert means that the secret influences certain mi-
croarchitectural registers. It needs to be verified whether or
not each P-alert can be extended to an information flow
into program-visible architectural registers. As elaborated in
Sec. VI, using standard procedures of commercially available
property checking, we can establish proofs by mathematical
induction, taking the P-alerts as the base case of the induction.
The inductive proofs build upon the UPEC computational
model and check whether or not a state sequence exists from
any of the known P-alerts to any other P-alert or L-alert. If no
such sequence exists, then the system is proven to be secure.
In this way, we proved security from covert channels also for
the case when the secret is in the cache. The manual effort for
this is within a few person days and is small compared to the
total design efforts for processor design that usually are on the
order of person years for processors of medium complexity.
The complexity of an inductive proof for one selected case of
the P-alerts is shown in Table I as an example.
B. Experiments on the modified RocketChip designs
Table II shows the proof complexity for finding the vul-
nerabilities in the modified designs. For each case, the UPEC
methodology produced meaningful P-alerts and L-alerts. When
incrementing the window length in search for an L-alert, new
P-alerts occurred which were obvious indications of security
violations. None of these violations exploits any branch pre-
diction of the RocketChip. For example, in the Meltdown-
style vulnerability, within seconds UPEC produced a P-alert
in which the non-uniqueness manifests itself in the valid bits
and tags of certain cache lines. This is a well-known starting
point for side channel attacks so that, in practice, no further
examinations would be needed. However, if the designer does
not have such knowledge the procedure may be continued
without any manual analysis until an L-alert occurs. This took
about 18 min of CPU time. For the design vulnerable to an
Orc attack the behavior was similar, as detailed in Table II.
C. Violation of memory protection in RocketChip
UPEC also found a case of ISA incompliance in the
implementation of the RISC-V Physical Memory Protection
mechanism in RocketChip. PMP in the RISC-V ISA is man-
aged by having pairs of address and configuration registers
(PMP entry). There are 16 registers for 32-bit addresses, each
of them associated with an 8-bit configuration register for
storing access attributes.
There is also a locking mechanism by which the software
can lock PMP entries from being updated, i.e., only a system
reboot can change the contents of any PMP entry. According to
the ISA specification, if a memory range and the PMP entry for
the end address is locked, the PMP entry of the start address
must be automatically locked, regardless of the contents of the
associated configuration register.
This mechanism has not been correctly implemented in the
RocketChip, enabling a modification of the start address of a
locked memory range in privileged mode, without requiring a
reboot. This is clearly a vulnerability, and a bug with respect
to the specification. The detection of this security violation in
PMP is actually an example showing that the UPEC property
of Eq. 1 also covers information leakage through a “main
channel”, i.e., in the case where an attacker may gain direct
access to a secret. Such cases can be identified by conventional
functional design verification techniques. However, in UPEC
they are covered without targeting any security specification
and can be identified in the same verification framework as
side channel-based vulnerabilities. In the current version of
RocketChip, the bug has already been fixed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that covert channel attacks are not
limited to high-end processors but can affect a larger range
of architectures. While all previous attacks were found by
clever thinking of a human attacker, this paper presented
UPEC, an automated method to systematically detect all
vulnerabilities by covert channels, including those by covert
channels unknown so far. Future work will explore measures
to improve the scalability of UPEC to handle larger processors.
As explained in Sec. V, if there is a security violation, it is
guaranteed that this will be indicated within a single clock cy-
cle by a P-alert. Longer unrollings of the UPEC computational
model were only chosen to facilitate the manual process for
diagnosis and the setting up of induction proofs. Therefore,
we intend to automate the construction of induction proofs, as
needed for the methodology of Sec. VI. This does not only
remove the manual efforts for P-alert diagnosis and for setting
up the induction proofs. Also, by merit of this automation,
the UPEC computational model can be restricted to only
two clock cycles. This drastically reduces the computational
complexity. In addition, a compositional approach to UPEC
will be explored.
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